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Abstract 
The cultural appropriation of ideas about hacking and opening knowledge have had 
significant impact on ways of developing participation in creating knowledge in the 
public interest. In particular, the ideal of hacking as developed through studies of free 
and open source (F/OS) has highlighted the value of processes of participation, 
including participatory governance, in relation to the value of expanded accessibility 
of knowledge, including knowledge commons. Yet these means and ends are often 
conflated. This paper employs three examples of projects where hacker-inspired 
perspectives on scientific knowledge contend with institutional perspectives. Each 
example develops differently the relationships between means and ends in relation to 
contests of authority and legitimacy. The paper’s analysis suggests that while hacker 
culture’s focus on authority developed in relation to participation has had great 
traction in business and in public interest science, this may come at the cost of a 
potential contribution to rethinking the value of knowledge in the public interest. 
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Introduction 
In trying to understand the cultural significance of hacking and DIY culture, it’s easy 
to conflate means and ends. Much research on hacking has focused on how 
participatory engagement creates alternative ways of engaging with machines, 
intellectual property or material. At the same time, there is another interpretation 
threaded through scholarship on hacking – that it has ends, and that the hack might 
transform the way the machine works, the way knowledge is shared, or the material 
object’s final form. This interpretation is especially salient for studies of hacking in 
the free software tradition and in discussions of the importance of creating knowledge 
commons using intellectual property hacks.  Yet means and ends are rarely separated, 
even when hacking culture is explicitly connected with the notion of the public 
interest, as it is in relation to open knowledge and science. This paper pursues two 
(slightly contradictory) goals:  1. To advance an ethical critique of the focus on 
participation within hacking culture; and 2.  To explore how this focus on 
participation conflates the means and ends of hacking practice. To draw out the first 
point, it builds upon Mansell’s (2013) analysis of how modes of authority become 
significant for managing knowledge commons, examining the relationship between 
the legitimacy of participation within hacking culture and “adaptive” forms of 
authority. To develop the second, it extends Collins and Evan’s (2002) discussion of 
expertise and public knowledge and reveals how a focus on authority and legitimacy 
in relation to participation (rather than engagement with other politics of expertise) 
prevent a true focus on what the outcomes of hacking might produce for expanded 
notions of the public interest.  
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To develop these two linked arguments, I consider three examples of projects where 
hacking culture is positioned as contributing to the public interest. In the first 
example, the development of the CERN Open Hardware License (CERN OHL), 
researchers in the Beams and the Knowledge Exchange Sections at the European 
High-Energy established an open-source community that deliberately included 
members whose authority emerged from their long association with either open 
source license development or the practice of open hardware development. In the 
second example, the non-profit PublicLab employs open hardware as part of a 
strategy for broadening environmental inquiry that is consciously linked to DIY ethics 
and what Ratto and Boler (2014) refer to as ‘critical making.’ In this mode, the DIY 
ethos is a ‘critical’ activity that ‘provides both the possibility to intervene 
substantively in systems of authority and power and that offers an important site for 
reflecting on how such power is constituted by infrastructures, institutions, 
communities and practices” (p. 1).  In the third example of the Internet of Things 
Academy, more accessible hardware raises questions about what kinds of scientific 
data garners more legitimacy. Designers on this project employ hardware sensors 
including noise and air quality monitors, that produce well calibrated measurements 
of similar quality to those used by scientific professionals. All of the examples engage 
with the notion of open hardware, enrolling these projects in debates about the means 
and ends of hacker projects like the GPL (see Powell, 2012).  
 
Open hardware raises questions about how to extend the provisions for keeping 
intellectual property in commons. This is similar to what Barron refers to as “the 
tendency to problematize the technical infrastructures underpinning today’s digitally 
mediated public spheres” (2013, p. 599).  To practitioners seeking to maximize 
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participation in technological or scientific knowledge production, open hardware puts 
equipment in the hands of ordinary people, permitting a hack of science itself 
(McQuillan, 2014). In addition, open hardware can contribute to a DIY ethic of 
creative repurposing that positions hacking, tinkering and making of scientific 
measurement equipment as political in itself. The examples in the paper illustrate how 
the contests of authority within hacking culture gain greater political significance 
when they are played out over concerns related to the public interest. 
 
 
Hacking culture and its contests 
 
Hacking and hackers have transformed the social world outside of software. Social 
researchers situate hacking as a form of spontaneous techno-cultural jouissance 
(Levy, 1984; Thomas, 2002; Jordan, 2008), as a model for participation-based 
governance (Mateo-Garcia and Steinmueller, 2008; Dafermos 2013; Kostidiakis 
2013) with the possibility to transform markets more broadly (Benkler 2006; Benkler 
2011), as the enactment of critiques of the politics of technological systems (Kelty, 
2006; Barron, 2013; Bodo, 2014; Sauter, 2014) and intellectual property systems 
(Lessig, 2006; Barron, 2012), or as an engagement with the culture and performance 
of masculinity and expertise (Dunbar-Hester, 2011). We also assess the relationship 
between hacking and the social, political and economic systems that are transformed 
by expansions of hacking practice. When Wark (2013) writes that “the hacker makes 
something new out of property that belongs to everyone in the first place” (p.73) he, 
like Soderberg (2008), claims that hacking reveals as well as transforms cultural and 
technical products, making us aware of their status as common knowledge usable by 
all. 
Here we are reminded that hacker participation in creating projects like free and open 
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source software (F/OS) led to the development and transformation of political values 
like liberalism (Coleman, 2012) through development of ‘recursive publics’ who 
create the means for their own perpetuation (Kelty, 2006) and through the reworking 
of intellectual property regimes to suggest possibilities for the creation of knowledge 
in commons (Stallmann, 1989; Lessig, 2006). We are also reminded of the 
possibilities for ‘democratic rationalization’ of technology (Feenberg, 2008; Milberry 
2014) and hence the possibility that hacking, as a form of DIY practice, could 
prefigure or perhaps exemplify a democratization of technical or scientific 
knowledge.   These varying political outcomes also include the contention that 
participation in hacking and other DIY projects models a democratization of 
knowledge through ‘critical making’ (Ratto, 2011; Ratto and Boler, 2014) and a 
potential transformation and broadening of scientific publics through DIY speculation 
through design (Di Salvo, 2014).  
At the same time, features of hacking culture can re-invigorate existing cultural 
formations, for example through the development of open-source organizational 
culture within F/OS and its subsequent embedding of participation-based value within 
software production economies (Weber, 2006; Berdou 2011), and ‘prosumer’ 
practices (Moody, 2002) leading to the development of different products (von 
Hippel, 2005). Also in the economic sphere, the participation and networked 
relationships have been claimed as foundations for a network and reputation-based 
economy (Benkler, 2006). This reading of hacking culture celebrates individualism, 
participation, and reputation within a ‘new spirit’ of capitalism (Barron, 2013) and 
neoliberal governance (Cammaerts, 2011). 
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In this review of hacking’s significance, two strands emerge: one, a valorization of 
participation, both as a feature of governance and as a mode of engagement with 
institutional power; and two, a evocation of a transformation of knowledge production 
and accessibility, extending from technical to scientific knowledge. The two strands 
illustrate how hacking culture is associated with transformations in means 
(participation) and ends (most often, the modes of production of software, but now, 
the modes of production of scientific and public interest knowledge). These are often 
conflated. This paper intervenes in this debate to provide an analysis of the 
consequences of the focus on participation rather than outcomes of hacking. These 
consequences include the market appropriations of hacking processes already 
considered in the literature (Cammaerts, 2011; Powell, 2012) as well as a limited 
transformation of the processes of scientific and public interest knowledge 
production. 
 
The paper builds on previous work on authority and legitimacy in relation to both 
participation and knowledge production in hacking culture, especially the principles 
of adaptive and constituted authority developed by Mansell (2013), and the 
assessment of how contests of legitimacy (Collins and Evans, 2011) relate to 
transformations in knowledge practices. This extends previous work on governance 
and participation within hacker communities (Kostakis, 2010; Kostakis et al 2014), 
particularly F/OS hackers (Dafermos, 2001; Dafermos and Soderberg 2013), but also 
follows a turn in the science studies literature on expertise that has become 
increasingly concerned with how expertise is legitimated in different contexts.  
 
 
Authority and legitimacy: F/OS and the GPL 
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Hacking culture sets up novel dynamics of authority: hackers are understood to 
establish their own authority, or “knowledge of purpose and technique acquired and 
demonstrated through participation” (Steinmueller and Mateo-Garcia 2008 p. 336). In 
contrast to the authority associated with institutions accrued through symbolic 
reinforcement of the functional necessity for an institution (Castoriadis, 1987), the 
authority associated with hacker culture is rooted in the imagination of participation 
and in expertise consolidated through participation. Other scholars of hacking in the 
DIY vein have focused on how participation in building and rebuilding technology 
operate as strategies for eroding boundaries between experts and laypeople and 
redistributing authority (Dunbar-Hester, 2014).  
 
These forms of authority and legitimacy have also supported existing institutions, 
especially the institution of market capitalism. Much work over the past decade has 
identified how hacking practices; especially those related to F/OS production 
contribute to expertise and economic production within firms (Weber, 2006; Mansell 
and Berdou, 2009; Tapscott and Williams, 2008). Barron notes that the valorization of 
individual participation that is part of F/OS production has significant risks for the 
notion of collective goods: “In a reputational economy, creative production becomes a 
means to the end of forging a publicly recognizable identity: the goal is not so much 
to produce a body of work that can take on an existence beyond oneself as to become 
an entrepreneur of one’s self by associating as much activity as possible (preferably 
including that of others) with one’s name. If unchecked, this will yield a culture in 
which (self-) promotion takes priority over production; it is also liable to obscure the 
collective effort that sustains every project, erode mutual trust and loyalty, and 
ultimately undermine the FOSS spirit itself” (2013, pp. 618). Barron identifies that the 
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relationship between the means of authority developed through participation and the 
ends of production and collective value are collapsed and obscured by some features 
of the development of authority through participation. Other work goes further to 
examine the ambiguity of authority in relation to both participation and possible ways 
to develop (or value) knowledge. This second set of ideas raises questions about 
whether the emphasis on participation in hacking culture has consequences for its role 
in democratizing scientific knowledge production.  
 
Contests of authority 
In Mansell’s (2013) analysis of how modes of authority become significant for 
managing knowledge commons, and in Collins and Evan’s (2011) discussion of 
expertise and public knowledge, researchers identify how legitimacy develops 
through processes of participation which may not be matched in which ways they are 
perceived as being resolved.  
 
Adaptive knowledge legitimated through participation 
 
Mansell (2013) outlines how modes of authority become significant for managing 
knowledge commons, exploring the potential for collaborations between formal 
science professionals and loosely organized groups of people working on 
crowdsourcing projects. Differences in data curation highlight differences in the 
nature of authority - along a continuum between the ‘constituted authority’ of 
hierarchical relations established in reference to formal norms of science and its 
institutions, and the ‘adaptive authority’ “characterizing loose, bottom-up, often 
informal, forms of authority that are frequently associated with information activities 
 9 
of many loosely connected online groups” (2013 p. 256). Within these specific 
communities of practice, different individuals collect data that is valued differently 
depending on the form of authority the person’s associated with. Constituted authority 
validates the participation of the individuals who are part of the crowd. Adaptive 
authority validates the quality of the data and its later utility within scientific practice. 
While the practices associated with adaptive authority valorize the aggregation and 
sifting of knowledge for immediate purpose (such as collecting information in online 
repositories), constituted authority is concerned with curation of ‘useful’ scientific 
information and validation of who gets access to that knowledge.  
 
The notions of constituted and adaptive authority are helpful in developing a response 
to the challenge of creating ‘open innovation’ in scientific practice. In particular, 
Mansell’s distinction between forms of authority highlights how scientific expertise 
remains associated with the valorization of certain forms of knowledge and control of 
their access. In scientific crowdsourcing, people outside of scientific institutions more 
often value knowledge for its immediate purpose, or for the reputational value that 
contributing might garner. This conflicts with forms of constituted authority that are 
more closely associated with ‘expert’ knowledge located within scientific institutions. 
The crowdsourcing dynamics that are the subject of Mansell’s inquiry often create a 
power imbalance whereby “lay” contributors to crowdsourced scientific projects are 
positioned as amateurs and as data sources, rather than as collaborators. 
 
This kind of contest between adaptive and constituted authority mirrors the kinds of 
contests usually associated with hacker culture, in which hacker ethics of critique and 
revelation are placed in contrast with ethics of enclosure.  
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Here, in addition to the contested politics of authority, two further dynamics emerge: 
a politics of expertise, which distinguishes expert and lay knowledge and which aligns 
with participation as the means of hacking culture, and a politics of commoning, 
which seeks to connect them through the development and management of knowledge 
commons – arguably the desirable ends for public interest hacking culture.  
 
The politics of expertise 
 
Collins and Evans (2013) highlight how expertise must be identified for political 
ends.  They note that even within a framework where multiple forms of expertise are 
valuable, some gain greater legitimacy. There is one kind of expertise, often 
scientific, that “has gained a kind of universal authority across society in virtue of 
what everyone believes to be its efficacy” (pp. 251). In relation to this expertise others 
emerge, including a type of ‘contributory expertise’ that is in a field relevant to this 
highly legitimate expertise. Judgments then need to be made about the legitimacy of 
contributory expertise. Collins and Evans write, “it is more difficult to separate the 
credentialed scientist from the experienced practitioner than was once thought: when 
we move toward experience as a criterion of expertise the boundary around science 
softens, and the set of activities known as ‘science’ merges into expertise in general” 
(pp. 253)  
In this context, what becomes important is not expertise but legitimacy. Legitimacy 
can be conferred through relationships to structures of authority but also – as all of the 
previous studies of hacking culture identify – through resistance to structures of 
authority. This hinge point between authority and legitimacy motivates interest in 
expanding access to an creation of scientific knowledge: as Collins and Evans point 
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out, the high levels of legitimacy associated with ‘core’ scientific legitimacy lead to 
lower levels of certainty. This in turn means that other actors play roles in conferring 
legitimacy: the media, the people with ‘contributory expertise’, and other people in 
general. In this context, efforts to ‘democratize science’ in the public interest can be 
viewed as sites for the negotiation of legitimacy – the kind of sites we will shortly be 
discussing in relation to hacker culture and public interest science. 
The democratization of scientific production is considered through research on ‘open 
science’. The concerns of open science often have to do with the capacity to provide 
broader access to the literature, experimental materials, and data sharing (Wilbanks, 
2007), or the capacity to integrate different types of information and knowledge as 
part of a broader innovation process (Lakhani and Panetta, 2007). These concerns 
foreground ‘openness’ related to accessibility, whether of code, data, or knowledge. 
This contrasts with the research on F/OSS (Coleman 2012) that places an emphasis on 
the process and politics of opening things up, where  ‘openness’ connects with a 
politics of critique. They are also implicitly oriented towards participation as a value 
in itself rather than in orientation to an outcome, but this literature, more than the 
more canonical discussions of hacker culture’s governance processes, also gestures 
towards the ideal outcome of the knowledge commons 
 
The politics of commoning 
The institutional arrangement of maintaining resources in commons has been 
thoroughly investigated by Ostrom (1990), and expanded through studies on various 
forms of commons data management (Fuster Morell, 2010) and open source software. 
Much previous work on the institutional management of such ‘knowledge commons’ 
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has investigated forms of social ordering and governance (Madison et al 2014) 
generating important insights on how commons can be maintained. The commons has 
an orthogonal relationship to hacker culture. It is not necessarily always the end goal 
of hacking, in contrast to the expression of individual liberty that Coleman (2011) 
links to practices of F/OS activism. In the economic realm, a similar legitimacy 
linking participation to the ‘spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005) has 
become integrated into ‘lean’ ‘networked’ modes of production. This, as Barron 
points out, “embed[s] new modalities of control over both production and 
consumption, and extend[s] commodification processes rather than curtailing them” 
(2013, p. 609). The question then becomes, as Mansell’s work reiterates, whether the 
kinds of authority associated with ‘contributory expertise’ and networked 
participation of the kind valorized within hacking culture are able to transform other 
structures of power rather than being subsumed to them. F/OS production does create 
a commons of re-usable intellectual property, and the extension of this commons was 
one rationale for the development of open source hardware licenses (see Powell, 
2012).  
As an organizing and political principle, the commons challenges some of the 
separations between forms of expertise as outlined by Collins and Evans, and evokes 
the promise of hacking to enact disruption to release to the people something that 
always should have been liberated (to paraphrase Wark, 2006). The following section 
tracks how this promise has been enacted through different types of participation 
across three projects linked by their engagement with open hardware in relation to 
science and the public interest. They illustrate that contests of authority in relation to 
legitimacy often play out as confusions between the means and ends of ‘hacking’ 
knowledge systems. 
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Examples 
 
CERN OHL 
 
The first example, of the development of the CERN open hardware license, directly 
draws upon the notion of the knowledge commons as a means of integrating 
knowledge drawn from hacker and advocacy communities with knowledge produced 
within CERN. It also shows how hacker culture animates this integration, providing a 
way to highlight the flexibility and openness of a particular group of CERN 
researchers. The development of the CERN open hardware license thus fits within a 
longer history of knowledge exchange at the institute, but seeks a different kind of 
engagement with the ‘non-expert’ partners than some other projects.  
 
Since it’s founding in 1954, the European high-energy physics lab (CERN) has 
intentionally developed strategies for intensive scientific collaboration (Krige, 2001). 
The Centre is associated with what Collins (1998) has identified as ‘open evidential 
culture’. CERN’s most recent, complex and multidisciplinary work, the creation of 
the ATLAS particle detector and the development of the Large Hadron Collider, have 
also required intense collaboration employing distributed working processes that 
brought together culturally heterogeneous researchers working in very different 
institutional settings (Boisot, 2011). Boisot’s description of the work on the ATLAS 
detector draws on a narrative familiar to scholars of F/OS and open collaboration, 
highlighting collaboration and ‘emergent strategies’ that Boisot frames as typical of 
adhocracy (Toffler, 1970). In his report, the flexibility of the membership’s work was 
coordinated around the detector, solidified by shared values among the many 
participants, and facilitated by the use of ICTs. This narrative of flexibility and 
collaboration has been part of the institutional identity of CERN (see Collins 1998, 
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Knorr Cetina, 1999), supporting the efforts to develop open hardware as a means to 
foster collaboration within and outside the institution. Although CERN uses 
crowdsourced science projects as one of their knowledge transfer strategies, the 
CERN OHL project is unique in that its public engagement comes mainly through the 
process of defining the parameters of the open source project 
 
Javier Serrano of the Beams Section, and Myriam Ayass of the Knowledge Transfer 
section launched the project in 2011 as a way to standardize the intellectual property 
relations of submission to the repository for open hardware designs that Serrano had 
developed. In 2011, the two published a first version of the license and began 
consultation with hardware hackers and other open hardware advocates, visiting open 
hardware conferences and Maker Faires and establishing a public mailing list. The 
expertise and experience of the participants in these conferences and mailing list 
discussions was perceived as being essential for the development of the license.  
 
The license was intended to provide a parallel for electronics designs to the GPL 
licensing that applies to all software code written at CERN. The GPL was chosen 
because “Open Source principles encourage the creation of open communities and 
collaborations of users invited to improve and complement the software and share 
their enhancements with the entire community. This accords with the historical CERN 
collaborative spirit and maximizes the in-kind return to CERN. In substance, this 
recommendation promotes the concept of collaborative dissemination . . . the 
Copyleft philosophy fits best with CERN scientific philosophy and tradition” 
(Fluckiger, 2012). The support within CERN for ‘collaborative dissemination’ 
foreshadows some of the challenges between balancing the means through which 
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software is improved by greater numbers of participants, and the ends to which 
‘collaborative dissemination’ might be directed.  
 
In interviews with Serrano and with members of the Knowledge Exchange team, it is 
clear that the license was developed in order to facilitate collaboration with 
companies and with individual hackers and makers. But the interest was not only in 
ends, that is, in having a final product that would allow the Beams Section to work 
more closely with companies, or benefit from discussions among open source 
advocates. It was also about means, and the significance of employing a process that 
respected the expertise outside of CERN as much as inside. In this process, hardware 
hacker and advocacy communities were positioned as essential to the development of 
the open hardware license: “I see it sometimes as enlarging our team … because the 
documents are all public, if [a collaborator] happens to be from a company… he’s just 
one more guy collaborating” (Javier Serrano, 2013, personal communication). 
Serrano describes himself as a facilitator but insists that he is not skilled enough to be 
a hacker: “I know impressive hackers, and I would not say I am in the same league as 
them.  But I believe in teams a lot, and what I am doing allows them to do very cool 
stuff, so I’m very proud of that” (Javier Serrano, 2013, personal communication).   
 
This vision is of an integrated team, where both the ‘impressive hackers’ located 
outside of CERN and the researchers within can work towards the same goal. In the 
CERN OHL project, the goal was to create a hardware license in the same mode as 
the GPL. This was for two reasons: Serrano was himself a free software advocate, and 
inspired by the notion of creating an ever expanding knowledge commons that would 
include hardware as well as software. His efforts to establish the CERN OHL 
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contributed to an ecosystem of open hardware licenses that reflected different 
philosophical and political stances (see Powell, 2012). Gaining legitimacy and 
support from the open source advocacy community and from hardware hackers was 
essential for Serrano’s broader goal of extending the GPL into new contexts. 
 
To gain this legitimacy, the license was discussed on a mailing list.  As Powell (2015) 
describes, these discussions demonstrated the difficulty of determining what open 
hardware referred to: accessible designs, plans whose components are totally re-
usable, a better form of knowledge commons, or recipes and descriptions for 
construction placed in a repository. Contention between these different ways of 
thinking about open hardware was in part resolved by allowing the license to act as a 
‘boundary object’ (Star and Greisemer, 1998) – a shared framework that permits 
collaboration between groups developing different kinds of knowledge. 
 
The resolution of the mailing list discussion solidified the importance of adaptive 
knowledge and hacker relationships for the CERN OHL. As a result of points raised 
by the participants from the open source community, the license’s new version 
included provisions that favoured this group’s interests over those of the Beams 
Section and the Knowledge Exchange Section. The new version of the license 
removed a provision that would require anyone who used a licensed design to inform 
the person who licensed it about how they were using it. This would have been very 
helpful for CERN, since it would have allowed the Knowledge Exchange section to 
monitor the use of material and ideas developed within CERN. In short, this decision 
valorized the interests of the participants and aligned with their adaptive authority, 
rather than supporting the long-term interest of identifying where and how open-
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source material is produced. This was in some ways an action oriented towards the 
means of collaboration rather than the ends of better identifying open-source 
materials. 
 
Not all members of the open source community supported the development of a GPL-
type license for hardware as the best way to create and broaden a knowledge 
commons related to electronic designs. Longtime open source advocate Bruce Perens, 
one of the participants in the CERN OHL license development, and a well-known 
developer of open software licenses and standards argued that open hardware licenses 
have the unintended consequence of creating more, not less, focus on intellectual 
property. This grates against the hacker perspective on these issues. In an interview 
hosted on hacker site Slashdot, Perens writes: 
 
“There's an important thing we should be aware of about Open Hardware. It's 
backwards in a way. Richard Stallman's Free Software movement opposed 
software being copyrighted. Copyright does not, for the most part, apply to 
hardware designs because they are functional . . . Patents apply to hardware 
designs, but most Open Hardware designers never pursue a patent on their 
designs. What then do they license to others? 
 
It turns out that we have a group of people at CERN, and one of my favorite 
lawyers and Yahoo, and even me, trying to add restrictions to something that 
is, for the most part, already in the public domain. And it came to me that this 
was backwards, and that we could be working against our own interest that 
way…The problem is that when we start licensing things that are actually in 
the public domain, we create norms that the courts take seriously . . . If we 
were responsible for taking hardware designs from public domain to 
copyrighted status, we'd be shooting ourselves in the foot.”  (Perens, 2014) 
 
Perens is concerned that the efforts at resisting enclosure of intellectual property and 
continuing to allow space for critique of these frameworks is actually being limited by 
the move towards licensing. He’s concerned that focusing on means and valorizing 
adaptive authority might limit the positive consequences of hacking by rendering 
 18 
much knowledge inaccessible – a fundamental impediment to facilitating further re-
use of common resources, and perhaps a brake on hacking practice. 
  
The development of the CERN Open Hardware license, then, is a consolidation of a 
particular perspective on the extension of GPL-inspired legal frameworks. In the 
extensive discussions on the CERN-OHL mailing list analyzed in Powell (2015), the 
challenge of successfully extending the principles of the GPL so that they would fully 
apply to electronics did not quite overlap with the interest in employing GPL 
principles to either expand a knowledge commons or to monitor CERN’s intellectual 
property. As Perens’s critique highlights, participation in modifying the license, and 
valorization of that participation as an alternative to the authority of CERN, 
inadvertently valorizes a narrower interpretation of open hardware and may even have 
the consequence of limiting the expansion of open hardware as a form of commonly 
accessible knowledge. This example thus illustrates the long term consequences of 
valorizing participation for its own sake, and highlights the tensions between adaptive 
and constituted authority. 
 
 
PublicLab 
 
In the second example, the US nonprofit PublicLab also engages with ideas of open 
hardware and hacker cultural ethics, this time in relation to the democratic ethics of 
DIY. Public Lab, a non-profit organization based in the USA but with local projects 
running in locations around the world, develops and applies open-source tools to 
environmental exploration and investigation. With an explicit focus on 
democratization of scientific knowledge through making, the project came to 
prominence after it used homemade balloons and digital cameras to map the Gulf oil 
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spill in 2010.  It aims at breaking down inequities of knowledge production by 
supporting DIY methods of collecting scientific data: "DIY aims to make technology 
something anyone can develop; Public Lab aims to make scientific research in 
environmental issues something anyone can do well. To make something oneself is to 
have a sense of ownership of it, and we extend this sense to scientific tools and data" 
(Warren and Regalado, 2014, np).   
 
Public Lab runs workshops around the world that teach people how to build relatively 
low-cost tools for environmental monitoring and community mapping, including kite-
mounted digital cameras. Cindy Regalado, a London-based member of PublicLab, 
explains that these projects are intended to develop a ‘spark of interest’ among 
people, and to employ DIY methods to help them understand that they could make 
their own monitoring tools to use in any kind of project (personal communication, 
2014). For PublicLab open source is understood as an ethic, linked to the DIY ethic of 
creative re-purposing of objects. The project aims to democratize scientific inquiry by 
democratizing the production of its measurement tools, but more specifically to 
expand the ability of people to feel capable of pursuing an interest or curiosity. 
 
PublicLab’s interpretation of open source aligns with a different politics of expertise 
than the integration of ‘contributory expert’ authority to knowledge sharing at CERN. 
For PublicLab, the ethic of open source that motivates their projects is concerned with 
increasing accessibility of knowledge and allowing more people to understand how to 
collect and represent information about their lives and communities. In this enactment 
of public interest science, the public interest is served by the public understanding the 
principles of science and feeling empowered to participate. Although the project is 
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best-known for supporting local residents in designing and deploying homemade 
aerial cameras to map the local impact of the Gulf oil spill, advocates stress that the 
purpose of these projects is not to develop tools that produce scientifically verifiable 
data, but rather to encourage participation in creating tools and understanding science. 
 
This is especially evident in PLOTS, PublicLab’s open knowledge repository, which 
includes research notes, designs and instructions on how to build scientific 
measurement tools, including aerial cameras assembled from inexpensive digital 
cameras and large home-made kites. While some electronics designs shared on 
PLOTS use the CERN open hardware license, the repository is mostly meant to allow 
people to openly share, create, and reproduce tools for measurement and story telling. 
The knowledge is ‘open’ because the equipment is relatively inexpensive and because 
know-how is shared through the research notes and instructions. 
 
PLOTS valorizes adaptive knowledge. It focuses on the financial accessibility of 
materials and the significance of participation in using them and doesn’t necessarily 
collect or share the results of that participation. It decenters scientific value away 
from sites of constituted knowledge and authority, which place more value on the 
quality of scientific results. PublicLab grounds knowledge in material practice – as 
their 2013 annual report reads, “creating tools and communities of expertise (whether 
local or scientific)” (PublicLab, 2014). While this has significant value as a way of 
valorizing alternatives to constituted authority, it also reinforces a divide between 
modes of authority; where scientific institutions are still sources of important 
knowledge, but not necessarily collaborators in the horizontal processes of co-
creation. Furthermore, there is an important difference in how open hardware is 
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imagined in the CERN OHL and in the PublicLabs contexts. In the former, open 
hardware refers to design specifications sufficient to allow the electronics to be 
constructed by someone with the appropriate skills, in the latter, to financial 
accessibility and ease of construction. These two different ways of conceiving of open 
hardware do align, as open source designs that can be re-used render hardware like 
the Arduino lower in cost and easier to use. But they also diverge. Attempts like the 
CERN OHL to develop a stock of re-usable hardware designs through the integration 
of hacker practices into scientific collaboration imagine open hardware differently 
than the Public Labs projects that valorize knowing through making. 
 
As with the CERN case, there are complexities that highlight the differences in 
legitimacy in relation to means, and legitimacy in relation to ends. The DIY objects 
constructed in PublicLab projects help people without scientific knowledge to 
develop and amplify their comfort with scientific practice. However, this positions 
scientific knowledge and authority as something separate, rather than as something to 
be collectively developed. In terms of process, this means that the opportunities for 
consistent negotiation between forms of authority are more limited. In terms of result, 
the separation between forms of authority widens, and the legitimacy of institutional 
science is reinforced by the fact that the data collected by inexpensive sensors is often 
of poor quality or not comparable with data produced by scientific institutions. This 
distinction is at the heart of the separation that Mansell identifies between the two 
forms of authority. As she notes, this separation complicates efforts at establishing 
knowledge commons because of the conflict between different perspectives on which 
kinds of knowledge ought to be part of such commons. Finally, the explicit 
association between material engagement and empowerment, while central to the 
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mobilization of hacking culture, also reveals the fractured relationships between 
technical prowess and other forms of empowerment related to race and gender 
(Dunbar-Hester, 2010). For PublicLab, shareable knowledge is not an end goal, but 
part of the process that is intimately linked to making and doing. All of the legitimacy 
is thus associated with means, rather than with ends that could include an ongoing 
scientific conversation or the production of scientific data. 
 
Internet of Things Academy 
 
The final example, the Internet of Things Academy (IoTA) run by the Superflux 
design agency, more accessible hardware raises questions about what kinds of 
scientific data garners more legitimacy. Designers on this project employ 
environmental sensors including noise and air quality monitors, that produce well 
calibrated measurements of similar quality to those used by scientific professionals 
including policy-makers. Data from these sensors are intended to challenge 
government data with data collected by citizens with particular concerns (aircraft 
noise and air quality). The quality of data (and thus of the hardware) becomes more 
important than their accessibility to the citizens.  
 
IoTA has two pilot projects that use sensor based networks (the ‘Internet of Things’) 
to address civic concerns. These are designed so that engagement with the design of 
data collection and analysis is very accessible, while not insisting that participants 
must engage in construction of hardware. The IOTA project is meant to help to 
valorize things that citizens already know about, by employing sensor technologies 
along with ‘little data’ collection technologies like daily notebooks. The first pilot 
called NoiseNap, measured noise pollution under London flightpaths, and BuggyAir, 
a project currently under development, will distribute air quality sensors to families to 
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mount on their baby buggies. These sensors will then measure air quality as it is 
experienced at ground level and in areas where children are travelling.   
 
The BuggyAir project in particular encourages the development of very high quality 
data, according to Superflux founder Anab Jain. This is to encourage two possible 
outcomes: first, behavior change in participants and other individuals as a result of the 
BuggyAir readings (this might include avoiding walking on routes where the sensors 
record very high air pollution) and second, policy change on the part of governments 
and standards setters who might respond to legitimate high quality data. Jain explains: 
“Quality is important. How can you have accurate enough data so you can advocate 
for car companies to consider new standards for brakes [that are one of the major 
contributors to particulate matter (PM) ground level air pollution]. This is small data. 
It will never be big data, so it has to be good data” (Personal communication, 2015).  
 
In contrast to the approach of PublicLab, where financial accessibility of hardware is 
a key feature of the project’s openness and accessibility, BuggyAir employs 
proprietary sensors that cost £500 each and which are precisely calibrated to have 
97% accuracy in measuring air pollution of all types, including particulate matter 
which composes 80% of ground level air pollution in London. This calibration and 
quality are understood as increasing the legitimacy of citizen-collected data. Jain and 
her team are concerned that the very accessibility of inexpensive scientific tools may 
mean that the data they produce is not considered legitimate from the perspective of 
constituted authority: ‘these citizen science projects, they might have a button you can 
wear, but the data is not even 50% reliable” (personal communication, 2015). 
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The IoTA pilots stress the legitimacy of their sensor data as a pathway towards 
valorizing citizen perspectives. In the NoiseNap pilot the sensor data on noise levels 
is placed together with journal entries describing the context and experience of 
aircraft noise. However, in both pilots, the technologies of scientific measurement are 
black boxed. Thus, the projects valorize non-expert knowledge and the adaptive 
authority that investigates its social and economic context, but does so by closing off 
the material praxis of data collection.  
 
In comparison to our other two examples, IoTA’s engagement with hardware and 
public interest scientific knowledge is more oriented toward ends than means. The 
accessibility of hardware and electronics makes it possible to design civic data 
collection tools that use the same kinds of calibrations as the tools used by 
governments, but repositions the site of data collection so that communities whose 
interests may not be represented in official data collection can offer their data as part 
of their political voice. This constructs legitimacy in relation to constituted authority: 
the goal is to produce data that is valid on the terms that scientific and policy 
practitioners establish. The end goal of producing such valid data supersedes – to an 
extent – the means of participation that are the focus of other civic science projects. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
DIY and hacking culture operate by undermining and appropriating systems and 
structures through material practice. This is more critique than integration, of 
institutional knowledge. The use of scientific hardware and measurement practices 
to collect and represent data coming from an alternative point of view illustrates some 
of the politics that can lie beneath engagements between adaptive and constituted 
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authority. Producing, creating, curating and contextualizing data obtained through 
scientific equipment or using scientific methods may provide an entry into broader 
political or policy discussions. This is a departure from many of the ways that hacking 
culture has been connected with scientific knowledge and the public interest.  
 
The examples developed in this paper illustrate how the development of legitimacy in 
relation to participation has often characterized the way hacking has engaged with 
institutionalized frameworks. Participation comes to be associated with forms of 
governance that are understood as valuable for market capitalism or even for the 
development of ‘collaborative dissemination’ in science. There are advantages of this: 
an ethic of participatory knowledge creation as developed through the CERN OHL, or 
a process of empowerment through appropriating science in a DIY ethic. But there are 
disadvantages too: that the development of the public interest, or the “FOSS ethic” is 
weakened by too much focus on ‘adaptive’ authority and participatory governance.  
 
Possibly, too much of a focus on means as opposed to ends can limit the outcomes of 
this engagement. In other words, the means of participation can limit the ends of 
shareable knowledge creation. Is the solution to try to engage with science and policy 
on the terms that their ‘constituted’ authority establishes? What if this further 
mystifies science and technology, countering the efforts of DIY and hacking culture? 
As this paper illustrates, hacking culture evokes as an end goal the accessibility of 
knowledge, but its valorization of participation can many times limit the achievement 
of these ends. This is entangled with the ways that legitimacy is understood within 
hacking culture and within the scientific cultures that open-source projects now 
engage. Valorizing adaptive authority of participants strengthens the focus on means, 
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rather than the end goals of scientific investigation, which are often underpinned by 
reference to constituted authorities like scientific institutions or policy makers. The 
analysis here suggests that hacking culture has indeed made a difference in ideas 
about how to produce open knowledge, but that the outcomes of that production have 
not always produced the radical openness that hackers (and others) seek. 
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